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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930275-CA 
v. : 
RONALD L. BOREN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury on 
the elements of theft? 
"Determining the propriety of the instructions 
submitted to the jury presents a question of law, and we 
therefore review the trial court's instructions under a 
correction of error standard." Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 
(Utah App. 1993). Additionally, this Court "review[s] jury 
instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the jury 
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case." State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 205 
(Utah App. 1992). 
2. Where the trial court properly instructed the jury 
on the intent for theft and the State's burden of proof, did 
those instructions create a constitutionally impermissible 
mandatory rebuttable presumption? 
This issue is governed by the same standard of review 
as Issue 1. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutory provisions are at issue in this 
appeal (attached as Addendum A). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-404 (1990): 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(3) (1990): 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or 
for so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon 
payment of a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (R. 7-
8). 
Defendant filed a Motion in Limine requesting that the 
judge not instruct the jury on the statutory elements of theft 
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listed in Section 76-6-401 (3) (b) (R. 115-120). The trial court 
denied this motion (R. 383-85). 
A jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 212). 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on the trial 
court's denial of his motion in limine and the trial court's 
refusal to give a requested instruction adding the word 
"permanently" to the elements of theft (R. 225-26). The trial 
court denied the motion for a new trial (R. 361). 
The trial court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 
(Supp. 1992), reduced defendant's conviction one degree and 
sentenced defendant to zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison and to pay restitution in the amount of $150.00 (R. 265). 
The court stayed the sentence and placed defendant on thirty-six 
months probation (R. 265). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Jeb Clark, the victim in this case, purchased a car for 
99 cents (Tr. Feb. 9, 1993, "Tr.l" at 58) (R. 377, 379) (Exhibit 
1). The vehicle was operable after some initial repairs (Tr.l at 
58). The ignition operated with a screwdriver or knife, and no 
key was needed to start the car (Tr.l at 59, 63, 112) (Exhibit 
3) . 
Defendant's brother, assisted by defendant, repaired 
the car's brakes (Tr.l at 68) (R. 366). Defendant's brother 
frequently drove the car and had repaired the car in the past 
(Tr.l at 79, 93, 95). Mr. Clark was unaware that defendant had 
worked on the car and never discussed the brake job with 
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defendant (Tr.l at 69, 76, 92). However, Mr. Clark subsequently 
learned that defendant expected to be paid for the work (Tr.l at 
71) . 
On April 18, 1992, Mr. Clark lent the car to Lyla Shore 
(Tr.l at 64, 105). A witness saw defendant drive the car out of 
Ms. Shore's driveway (Tr.l at 83-84). Neither Mr. Clark nor Ms. 
Shore gave defendant permission to drive the car (Tr.l at 65, 
111) . 
Defendant told his son and his brother that he would 
return the car to Mr. Clark if he received compensation for his 
work on the brakes (Tr.l at 87-89) (R. 366-67). 
The next morning, Mr. Clark, Ms. Shore and Bryan Shore 
drove to defendant's ex-wife's house and saw the car parked in 
front of her house (Tr.l at 108, 114, 120). The license plates 
on the car had been changed (Tr.l at 65, 125-126). 
Defendant saw this group, ran from the house, threw the 
ignition switch into the field behind his house and hid behind a 
fence (Tr.l at 109, 110, 120). Mr. Clark heard defendant shout 
that the "next time he got ahold of the car, it would be in the 
Jordan River" (Tr.l at 74, 78). The police arrived and arrested 
defendant for theft of the car (Tr.l at ill). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly instructed the jury on the 
elements of theft. Defendant's requested instruction misstated 
the law by ignoring two of three alternate statutory definitions 
of "purpose to deprive" in the theft statute. The court 
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correctly instructed the jury on the requisite intent for theft. 
The court's instructions properly followed the statutory 
language, which does not create an impermissible "mandatory 
presumption." This Court defendant's conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
ON THE ELEMENTS OF THEFT 
Defendant nidJitis U K I J hi I t il erroneously fai] ed to 
include the word "permanently" when it instructed the jury on the 
elements of theft. Br. of App. at 5-12. However, such an 
instruction would isstatement c: f t .he .1 a i "' court 
properly instructed the jury on the law of theft. 
i Standard of Review for Jury Instructions 
"Determining Ihh propriety nstractions 
submitted to the jury presents a question of law, and we 
therefore review the trial court's instructions under a 
correction of error standard." Ames v. Maas, 8, 471 
(Utah App. 1993). Additionally, this Court "review[s] jury 
instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the jury 
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case." State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 
(Utah App. 1992). Furthermore, "the trial court is not required 
to give any requested jury instruction does not . . . 
accurately state the applicable law* State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, y^ 'i (Utah I 991) . 
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B. Jury Instructions in this Case 
Jury Instruction 9 tracked Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-404 
(1990) verbatim. The instruction read, "Under the law of the 
State of Utah, a person is guilty of theft if that person obtains 
or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof." (R. 193) 
(Instructions 8, 9, 10 are Attached as Addendum B). Section 76-
4-404 states: "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof." (Addendum A). 
Furthermore, the trial court correctly instructed the 
jury on the alternate statutory definitions of "purpose to 
deprive" set forth in Section 76-6-401(3): 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or 
for so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon 
payment of a reward or other 
compensation; t1] or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
defendant's object seems to have been to deprive the jury 
of the option of relying on this subsection, which defendant was 
forced to admit covered the facts of this case. Defendant's 
opening statement included this statement: "Now, the evidence is 
going to show that Mr. Boren, when Mr. Clark failed to pay him, 
Mr. Boren took the car and said, 'You can have it back, just give 
me my $25 for the work I've done on your car.'" (Tr. Feb. 9, 
1993 at 52) . 
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(emphasis added) (Addendum A ) . Jury Instruction 10 sets forth 
this language verbatim (R. 194) (Addendum B ) . 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Asay. 631 
P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1981) "[t]he wording of the given 
instructions recite ::i tl: ME st ati it : 1: j elements of the offense of 
theft nearly verbatim. Hence, no error is contained therein." 
C. Defendant's Proposed Instructions 
Misstated the Law 
Defendant complains that the term "permanently" in 
Instruction 10 "modifies only one the three alternative 
definitions" and that "the jury was allowed to consider either 
one of the two other alternatives, both of which were not 
modified by the adverb, 'permanently. '" 4-10. 
However, the legislature chose to include three alternative 
definitions of the intent necessary for a "purpose to deprive." 
Defendant's requested addition of the word "permanently" 
restricts the crime of theft to only one of three statutory 
definitions and is therefore, a misstatement of the law. As the 
supreme court held in James, "the trial court is not required to 
give any requested jury instruction if it does not . . . 
accurately state the applicable law 819 P.2d at 799. 
D. The Jury Considered Defendants Theory of 
the Case 
Additionally, the trial court adequately instructed the 
jury on defendant's theory of the case. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(4 ) (court obligated to give lesser included 
instruction if "there is a rational basis for a v erdict 
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acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting of 
the included offense"). Defendant asserted that he merely 
temporarily deprived the victim of the car and that he did not 
have the required intent for theft (R. 115-129, 384-85). 
However, the jury considered and rejected defendant's theory by 
following the jury instructions and convicting defendant of theft 
(R. 197-199, 212-215). The trial court properly instructed the 
jury on defendant's theory of the case by giving instructions on 
the lesser included offenses of the temporary deprivation of a 
motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-la-1311 (1) and joyriding 
in violation of Section 41-la-1314(1) (R. 197-199). The jury 
rejected these lesser included charges and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed theft.2 
POINT II 
THE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT RELIEVE THE STATE OF 
ITS BURDEN TO PROVE INTENT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT 
Defendant asserts that Instruction 10 
unconstitutionally relieved the State of its burden to prove 
every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt by 
creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption. Br. of App. at 12-
15. A jury instruction creates an unconstitutional mandatory 
defendant's reliance on State v. Chesnut. 621 P.2d 1228, 
1232 (Utah 1980), disapproved on other grounds State v. Crick, 
675 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1983), in support of his claim of error 
is misplaced. Br. of App. at 5-12. The supreme court overturned 
Chesnut's conviction because the trial court failed to instruct 
the jury on lesser included offenses. Id. at 1232. Here, the 
trial court properly instructed the jury on all requested lesser 
included offenses. 
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presumption where the language instructs the jury that it can 
"infer" an element cf the crime or that certain evidence creates 
a "prima facie" presumption of guilt. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 
442 U.S. 510, 515 (1979) (jury impermissibly instructed that 
"[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary 
consequences of his voluntary acts.") (emphasis added); Francis 
v. Franklin, 4/x u.o. ou/, 316 (1985) (improper instruction that 
"acts of a person nf smmd mind and discretion are presumed to be 
the product of the person's will," and that a person "is presumed 
to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts."). 
However, none of the instructions in this case contained this 
impermissible language (R. 188-211).3 
Contrary defendant assertion * he instructions do 
not provide that the State need only prove certain predicate 
defendant's reliance on two Utah cases in support of this 
position is likewise misplaced. He cites State v. Chambers, 709 
P.2d 321 (Utah 1985) and State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 
1987) for the proposition that a jury instruction that tracks 
statutory language verbatim creates this type of impermissible 
presumption. Br. of App. at 14-15. However, in both cases, the 
language of the statute, and the instruction, contained the 
impermissible language. Compare Chambers, 709 P.2d at 324 
("[p]ossession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence that the person in possession stole the 
property.") (emphasis added), and Johnson. 745 P.2d at 456 
("possession of property recently stolen, when a person in 
possession fails to make a satisfactory explanation of such 
possession, is a fact from which you may infer that the person in 
possession stole such property.11) (emphasis added), with, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1978), "[p]ossession of property 
recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the 
person in possession stole the property." This type of 
impermissible language is not found in the trial court's jury 
instructions (R. 188-211). 
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facts in order for the jury to presume intent. Rather, they 
clearly instructed the jury that the State bore the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the 
conscious object to deprive another of his property. 
Instruction 8 stated: 
You are instructed that in every crime or 
public offense, there must be a union or 
joint operation of the act and intent. A 
person is only guilty of an offense when his 
conduct is prohibited by law and he acts with 
some kind of criminal intent that is, he acts 
intentionally or knowingly as the definition 
of an offense requires. As used in these 
instructions, a person engages in conduct 
"intentionally" or with intent, when it is 
his conscious objective or desire to engage 
in conduct or cause the result. As used in 
these instructions, a persons engages in 
conduct "knowingly" or with knowledge, when 
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. 
(R. 192) (emphasis added). This instruction along with 
Instructions 9 and 10 forced the jury to focus on the definition 
of intent. When read in conjunction with Instructions 3, 5, and 
7 (attached as Addendum C), which emphasize the proper standard 
of proof, the jury understood that the State had to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that defendant had to have a "conscious 
objective" to meet the element of "purpose to deprive" in the 
crime of theft (R. 192, 194) (Addendum B) see Point I, Part B 
supra. The trial court never instructed the jury that it could 
infer or presume the requisite intent, or any other element of 
the crime, from any particular evidence. 
The instructions as a whole informed the jury of the 
intent required for theft. Defendant fails to demonstrate how 
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these instructions created an impermissible mandatory 
presumption. The jury properly based its guilty verdict on the 
evidence in accordance with these instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly instructed the jury on the 
elements of the crime of theft and the requisite intent. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm defendant's theft 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this if day of November, 1993 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
RALPH E. CHAMNESS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed by first class mail 
to RONALD S. FUJINO and ROGER SCOWCROFT, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOC, attorneys for appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ]£ day of November, 1993. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
History. C. 1963, 7*6-404, enacted by L. Croes-Refereneet. — Motor vehicle*, spe-
1*73, eh, 196, I 76-6-404. cUI anti-theft lswi, II 41-1-105 to 14-1-121. 
Shoplifting Act, I 78-11-14 et seq. 
PART 4 
THEFT 
76-6-401. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and 
birds, written instruments or other writings representing or embodying 
rights concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise 
containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility 
nature such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and 
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or tech-
nical information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which 
the owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, 
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to 
aecure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period 
or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not neces-
sarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law 
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, 
and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or 
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and 
that is likley to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor 
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now be-
lieve to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his 
judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without dis-
closing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impedi-
ment to the extfoyment of the property, whether the lien, security 
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not a matter 
of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not 
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however, 
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of 
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not 
intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed. 
History: C. 1963, 76-6-401, enacted by L. 
1S7S, eh. 166, I 76-6-401. 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense, 
there must be a union or joint operation of the act and intent, 
A person is only guilty of an offense when his conduct is 
prohibited by law and he acts with some kind of criminal intent that 
is, he acts intentionally or knowingly as the definition of an 
offense requires. 
As used in these instructions, a person engages in conduct 
* intentionally" or with intent, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in conduct or cause the result. 
As used in these instructions, a person engages in conduct 
"knowingly" or with knowledge, when he is aware that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the result. 
0019? 
INSTRUCTION NO. C\ 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of 
theft if that person obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof. 
001 
INSTRUCTION NO. tt> 
•Property" means anything of value, including tangible 
personal property. 
"Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a 
transfer of possession or of some other legally recognized 
interest in property, whether to the obtained or another. 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious objective 
/to withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or 
to use under circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be 
lost,^gf to restore the property only upon payment of a reward 
or other compensation, >^r to dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner will recover 
it. 
An "operable motor vehicle" is a motor vehicle capable of 
being driven. 
"On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or 
is near the day alleged in the Information. 
00194 
ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
Instruction No 1 is not to be considered by you as a 
statement of the facts proved in this case, but is to be re-
garded by you merely as a summarizeo itement <»II i:h H u I legalI oris 
of the Information. The mere fact that the defendant stands 
charged with offense is not fo he taken by you as any evi-
dence of his guilt. 
• '• • • '
 :
 ' INSTRUCTli ^ 
You are instructed that nformation defendant 
has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty denies 
each and all ] :: f tl: .- E essei it a all al legati ons of tl: ME • charge contained 
in the Information and casts upon the State the burden of proving 
each and all of the essential allegations thereof to your satis-
faction and beyond easonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
You diii mi mi in" i inn in i I il I 111 in i the mere fact that ih*> defendant 
has been charged with this offense and has been held to answer to 
the charge by a committing magistrate, not any evidence of his 
guilt ana 
by you in determining his guilt or innocence. 
00188 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the 
law applicable to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to 
follow the law as I shall state it to you. 
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that 
are presented by the allegations in the Information filed in this 
court and the defendant's plea of "not guilty". This duty you 
should perform uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion 
or prejudice against him. You must not suffer yourselves to be 
biased against the defendant because of the fact that he has been 
arrested for this offense, or because an Information has been filed 
against him, or because he has been brought before the court to 
stand trial. None of these facts is evidence of his guilt, and you 
are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them 
that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent. 
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in 
this trial and the law as stated to you by me. The law forbids 
you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both the State of 
Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and they do demand and 
expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider 
and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that you will 
reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such 
verdict may be. The verdict must express the individual opinion 
of each juror. 
ooisn 
' INSTRUCTION NO C 1 
All presumptions o* ^ w , independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he 
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of & 
reasonable-doubt as to whether his g til, li: m s a t J B facecni' i, s h o w n , 
1 entitled to an acquittal• 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State 
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is 
based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a whoJly spec 
possibility. Pro- >eyond a reasonable doubt is that degree 
proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding 
those who are bound to act conscientious!)- upon II i i J, u* . . . 
all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from 
the evidence or the lack of the evidence In tins ase 
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